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Summary. This paper is part of a bigger project where I try to evaluate and merge different 
philosophical and sociological approaches in order to understand and show how new technolo-
gies could change political life. This article aims to propose conceptual instruments suitable for 
that endeavor through the analysis of a small example of postmodern life – Digital Vigilantism – 
and based on ideas of Daniel Trottier, Zygmunt Bauman, and Michel Foucault. The swarm is a 
metaphor used by Zygmunt Bauman to show how the understanding of communities is changed 
in liquid modernity. Swarms are based on untied, uncontrolled, short-term relationships between 
consumers/users that are formed with the express purpose of achieving some goals. Swarms 
could be massive in numbers and have a lot of power for a quite short period. One such ex-
ample could be Digital Vigilantism, which is an act of punishing certain citizens – those believed 
to be deserving of punishment by Internet users. One particular form of digital vigilantism is 
disclosing someone’s personal information (addresses, phone numbers, emails, Facebook ac-
counts, etc.) for everybody to see in order to spread shaming acts. The acts of DV sometimes gain 
enough power to change the political agenda. The problem is that the interest of people to solve 
certain issues is often extremely short; meanwhile, a sustainable political act/change requires an 
active and stable effort for a much longer period. The main intrigue lies in whether the political 
act itself can change from being influenced by the swarm effect.
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Kaip naujosios technologijos nulemia politinio veiksmo 
suvokimą: Digital Vigilantism atvejis?
Santrauka. Šis straipsnis yra viena iš projekto, kuriame permąstoma, kaip naujosios tech-
nologijos keičia politinio veiksmo sampratą, dalių. Straipsnyje nagrinėjamas Digital Vigi-
lantism (toliau tekste DV) reiškinys glaudžiai susijęs tiek su diskusijomis apie naująsias 
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technologijas ir jų inspiruojamus pokyčius, tiek apie teisinę interneto veikimo pusę ir ban-
dymą ją sutvarkyti. Straipsnyje naudojamos skirtingos filosofinės ir sociologinės Danielio 
Trottier, Michelio Foucault ir Zygmunto Baumano idėjos. Jame analizuojamas Baumano 
pasiūlytos spiečiaus (angl. swarm) idėjos pritaikymas DV analizei siekiant suprasti, kaip 
spiečiaus fenomenas keičia patį politinio akto turinį ir jo supratimą. Trottier DV apibrėžia 
kaip procesą, kurio metu asmenys, pajutę, kad kito žmogaus ar žmonių veiksmai pažeidė 
tam tikras visuomenės normas, siekia atkurti teisingumą ir per mobiliuosius įrenginius ar 
socialines platformas spontaniškai ir autonomiškai koordinuoja atsaką. Įdomu, kad pa-
prastai neigiamai vertinami pasisakymai ar veiksmai nebūna rašomi sąmoningai siekiant 
sulaukti visuomenės reakcijos, šio proceso metu dažnai gali būti išviešinamos net mintys, 
kuriomis pasidalyta draugų rate. DV pavyzdžiu galima laikyti asmeninės, privačios infor-
macijos (adresų, telefonų numerių, el. pašto, sveikatos duomenų ir kt.) viešinimą siekiant 
sugėdinti ir nubausti. Plintant virtualioms technologijoms, vis dažniau tokio pobūdžio ak-
tai įgyja pakankamai galios pakeisti ir politinę darbotvarkę.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: Digital Vigilantism, internetinis linčo teismas, Baumanas, spiečius, 
naujosios technologijos, postmodernas, virtualybė.
Introduction
There is no doubt that new technologies are continuously provoking 
discussions and raising new questions in the daily political agenda. 
Heated discussions sometimes even transform into active actions, 
caused by such issues as stem cells, artificial insemination, frozen 
embryos, enhancement technologies, and others. In addition to all 
these biotechnological and medical topics, there are also ongoing 
discussions about the virtual world – for instance, cybersecurity, the 
processes of platformization, gaming, the threats and opportunities 
of social networks, and many others. These new, technologically 
driven issues arise at such a speed that it is hardly possible to re-
spond to them, or to think adequately about them. Obviously, the 
contextualization of discourses contributes to this, given that techno-
logical languages are closed and understandable almost exclusively 
to professionals, while philosophical and political reflection is “lag-
ging behind,” and there is a great lack of suitable conceptual instru-
ments for describing the ongoing processes. A so-called “empirical 
turn” occurs as a reaction to this, when across different philosophical 
branches, more and more attention is focused on better understanding 
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the new technological or scientific discoveries.1 The development of 
new ideas or tools is gaining traction as well. 
In general, the phenomenon of Digital Vigilantism (hereafter re-
ferred to as DV) discussed in this article is closely related to dis-
cussions about new technologies and the changes they inspire. The 
main incentive for writing this paper is to start a discussion about the 
changes that we are facing and which we do not know how to evalu-
ate and understand at the beginning. It is common to regard changes 
as inevitable and know that severe effects will follow, but we do not 
know what kind of effects these will be. The philosophical approach, 
which will be used in this paper, allows one to raise questions about 
the meaning of acting politically in postmodernity, which could be a 
good start for understanding the emerging phenomena by determin-
ing in what context they takes root. 
Thus, one of the problems is that the dream of the internet as a 
new agora for democracy is changing. More and more negative and 
quite the opposite effects can be seen and have to be understood in 
order to try to evaluate the current state of society and political acts. 
Users and legislators must also be more involved in thinking about 
the legal side of the internet and the attempts to fix it and to put a 
“legal leash” on it. This article aims to propose conceptual instru-
ments suitable for that endeavor through the analysis of a specific 
example of postmodern life – digital vigilantism – and based on the 
ideas of Zygmunt Bauman and Michel Foucault. The departure point 
of this article is Bauman’s proposed concept of the swarm, a differ-
ent way of being together, which replaces the traditional community. 
According to Bauman, “[i]n a liquid modern society of consumers, 
the swarm tends to replace the group – with its leaders, hierarchy of 
authority and pecking order.”2, 3 A swarm can do without all those at-
1 Brey Philip, “Philosophy of Technology after the Empirical Turn,” Techné: Research 
in Philosophy and Technology 14.1, 2010, p. 36–48.
2 Bauman Z., Consuming Life, Cambridge: Polity, 2007, p. 76. 
3 Disclaimer: the author of this paper is fully aware that Bauman’s comprehension of 
insect swarms or animal behavior patterns is quite limited. The metaphors and con-
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tributes and strategies without which a group could neither form nor 
sustain. “Swarms need not be burdened by the tools of survival; they 
assemble, disperse and gather again, from one occasion to another, 
each time guided by different, invariably shifting relevancies, and at-
tracted by changing and moving targets.”4
Is it possible to be politically motivated while acting according 
to the rules of a swarm, given that one of its main features is non-
affiliation, non-commitment, individual access, and maximization of 
efficiency? Is a political act possible in the case of the renunciation 
of the community and the transition into a swarm society? Is it still 
a political act as such, or does the concept of politics change, and 
the traditional definitions and rules are no longer valid? Can swarms 
coexist with other forms of being political? 
 The scope of digital vigilantes is quite broad: scambaiting, hacktiv-
ism, citizen-led cyber-stings, crowdsourced acts of vigilantism,5 and 
other forms. Digital vigilantism is a lynch law that has moved from 
reality to the virtual world and pervades in a variety of digital tools, 
which are extremely important and based on social media, the internet, 
and apps. The aims of DV differ vastly: from the will to implement 
social justice6 or citizen empowerment7 to personal revenge8 or propa-
ganda.9 This includes boredom or the personal satisfaction of learning 
clusions sometimes contradict the evidence gathered by studies of real life swarm 
behavior. Bauman uses a simplified, stereotypical, and even negative understanding 
of the swarm in order to put a stronger emphasis on its difference from the commu-
nity. For some examples of studies on bee swarms, see Kwong Henry, Christian Ja-
cob, “Evolutionary Exploration of Dynamic Swarm Behaviour,” The 2003 Congress on 
Evolutionary Computation, 2003. CEC’03. Vol. 1. IEEE, 2003. Kudělka M., Horák Z., 
Snášel V., Krömer P., Platoš J., & Abraham A., “Social and Swarm Aspects of Co-au-
thorship Network,” Logic Journal of the IGPL 20 (3), 2012, p. 634–643.
4 Bauman, p. 76.
5 Smallridge J. et al., “Understanding Cyber-vigilantism: A Conceptual Framework,” 
Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Criminology 8 (1), 2016, p. 59. 
6 Cheong, p. 471–487.
7 Smallridge, p. 57–70.
8 Andrews R., “Baiters teach Scammers a Lesson,” Wired, <https://www.wired.
com/2006/08/baiters-teach-scammers-a-lesson/>, 2018 06 14. 
9 Kasra, p. 172–188.
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new skills of hacking, which is a very important part of DV. To sum-
marize, DV could serve as a way to empower citizens but also as an 
antidemocratic mechanism for normalizing the coercion of raw power, 
which could be dangerous. In addition, the understanding of social jus-
tice varies extremely among groups of DV. Nevertheless, the relation 
with the law is problematic in every approach described above.
The attention of media and academic research on digital or online 
vigilantism has been increasing over the last decade.10 Nevertheless, 
it is still quite a new phenomenon and requires special attention be-
cause of its complexity and effects on different fields. In order to 
understand DV deeper, I decided to discuss a few specific questions 
concerned with the philosophy of technology. It goes back to the dis-
cussion on whether technology itself is a neutral tool or not.11 The 
approach of this paper is that technology is not fully neutral, even if 
it seems to be, and that movements and changes are dependent on the 
features of social media and other platforms.12 There are a consider-
able number of articles analyzing this phenomenon from the position 
of media studies13, 14, 15 or from a legal perspective16; however, there 
is not much analysis in the field of political philosophy – and the field 
of political science in general. 
The first part of the article aims to answer the question what Digi-
tal vigilantism is and how it is different from traditional vigilantism. 
Then, I want to put DV in the context and debates of philosophy of 
10 Smallridge, p. 58.
11 Balabanian N., “On the Presumed Neutrality of Technology,” IEEE Technology and 
Society Magazine 25 (4), 2006, p. 15–25.
12 More about platformization: Van Dijck J., “‘You have one identity’: Performing the 
Self on Facebook and LinkedIn,” Media, Culture & Society 35 (2), 2013, p. 199–215. 
13 Trottier D., “Digital Vigilantism as Weaponisation of Visibility,” Philosophy & Tech-
nology 30 (1), 2017, p. 55–72.
14 Kasra M., “Vigilantism, Public Shaming, and Social Media Hegemony: The Role of 
Digital-networked Images in Humiliation and Sociopolitical Control,” The Communi-
cation Review 20 (3), 2017, p. 172–188.
15 Cheong P. H., Gong J., “Cyber Vigilantism, Transmedia Collective Intelligence, and 
Civic Participation,” Chinese Journal of Communication 3 (4), 2010, p. 471–487. 
16 Smallridge, p. 57–70.
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technology. There are still heated debates in philosophy of technol-
ogy and in other fields whether technology really changes some old 
phenomena or just adds some additional features. This chapter tries 
to show that the difference is extreme and that we do not have the suf-
ficient instruments to analyze and understand the new phenomena of 
DV. The final part of the paper is an attempt to find ways to see DV in 
a new light. The ideas of Michel Foucault and Zygmunt Bauman are 
consulted as useful perspectives to reflect upon DV and its possible 
consequences for the political realm.
1. What is Digital Vigilantism and Why Is It Different 
from Traditional Vigilantism?
Vigilantism and vigilantes were and still are shocking and attract a 
lot of media and public interest. A number of scholars have sought to 
understand why vigilantism is so varied and, in a way, so confusing. 
There are many discussions in the academia on how to describe vigi-
lantism and pinpoint the scope of its acts, but these questions are not 
involved in this paper. In this article, I decided to use the quite com-
monly cited17 L. Johnston’s definition of vigilantism. This definition 
comes from criminology studies and is quite simple; therefore, it will 
be used as a starting point to understand the main aspects of vigilan-
tism: “a social movement giving rise to premeditated acts of force – or 
threatened force – by autonomous citizens.”18 The act of vigilantism 
has to include six elements for it to be considered conventional vigilan-
tism: planning, private agency, autonomous citizenship, use of physical 
force, reaction to crime/deviance, and personal and collective security. 
However, these elements accurately describe conventional vigilantism, 
but they are really problematic for understanding DV. 
17 Smallridge, p. 57.
18 Johnston L., “What is Vigilantism?” The British Journal of Criminology 36 (2), 1996, 
p. 220–236. 
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In order to be more specific, Table 1 below, taken from Trottier’s 
article, shows how the concept has changed from the conventional to 
the digital version. 
Table 1. D. Trottier: key features of conventional and digital vigilantism.19
 Conventional vigilantism 
(Johnston 1996)
Digital vigilantism
Planning Premeditation Facilitated spontaneity
Private agency Distinguished from state 
and corporate actors
Possible connections with 
state and corporate actors
Autonomous citizenship Self-protection Asserting new boundaries
Use of force Embodied Visibility as weapon
Reaction to crime/
deviance
Threat of established 
order
Fusion of local and 
mediated norms
Personal and collective 
security
Policing localized territory Mediated policing
It is clear that there are changes in all dimensions, and that even 
more different dimensions could be added. The main change is that 
vigilantism went from having more planning and a premeditative ap-
proach to action to being very reactive and spontaneous. It is also 
obvious that the understanding of what is painful and hurtful has 
changed. Nowadays, physical force is sometimes not even needed, as 
the negative visibility and negative records put on the internet could 
bring extremely serious consequences in real life.20 
The act of vigilance has been and still is politically driven, and 
this is digital vigilantism’s basic similarity with conventional vigi-
lantism. Politics can be viewed from two aspects: (a) in principle 
as related to the state, law, bureaucracy, etc.; (b) as the preservation 
and consolidation of moral norms. Moreover, it is important to un-
19 Table is cited from: Trottier D., “Digital Vigilantism as Weaponisation of Visibility,” 
p. 59.
20 Ibid., p. 55–72. 
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derstand that the act of DV is based on the idea that the “vigilan-
tes” are doing the things they do because they have to bring morality 
and justice back to the world.21 And not just any morality, but an 
extremely simplified, “crystal clear,” black-or-white concept of the 
morality that makes it easy to categorize people into good-doers and 
wrongdoers. By the acts of DV, the vigilantes seek purity and clar-
ity in morality (including the fight with bad protocol, hate speech, 
racism, sexism, terrorism, etc.). Regardless of the ideological reason 
behind DV attempts (even aimed either against racism or a possible 
terrorist attack), it usually violates individual privacy, is not based on 
the principle of innocent-until-proven-guilty, and does not attempt to 
look at the whole picture but rather at just one post, one photograph, 
or one video. In the view of vigilantes, it is obvious that the truth 
is “always on their side” and there is no reason to try to understand 
somebody from the “wrong-doers” side. Someone who suggests tak-
ing into account the arguments of “the dark side” could be regarded 
as a new target for DV.
In most cases, it can be said, “while lacking state authorization, 
vigilante groups do not perceive their actions as over-riding or trans-
gressing the legal order but construct themselves as self-anointed 
guardians rescuing national sovereignty, citizenship and the law’s 
moral sanctity, from cultural elites, moneyed interests, inept bureau-
crats and a sclerotic state.”22 The vigilantes perceive their actions as 
protecting, rescuing some sort of segment of society, or an idea, a 
moral position, which is being stigmatized. The action is presented 
as inevitable, obviously requiring the intervention of the “ordinary” 
people – otherwise it will remain unresolved, neglected, unnoticed. 
Such a negative emphasis on impartiality and non-interference is 
characteristic of both conventional and digital vigilance.
21 Kasra, p. 172–188.
22 Trottier D., “Digital Vigilantism as Critical Reinforcement of Law and Order,” 
Re.Framing Activism, 2019 03 07, <http://reframe.sussex.ac.uk/activistmedia/2016/04/
digital-vigilantism-as-critical-reinforcement-of-law-and-order/>, 2019 03 07. 
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The act of vigilance itself can be extremely diverse, ranging from 
public shaming, which often results in, for example, getting the sub-
ject fired from their job, to publishing all of the subject’s personal 
information (including that of their friends and family): full name, 
workplace, position, university, phone number, email, address, blood 
type, passwords, specific location, CCTV recordings, and anything 
else that may be “extracted” from the internet. 
One of the most important things and changes that DV brings is 
that an ordinary perpetrator can be the equal subject of a DV “attack” 
as an officer of the law – for instance, for inappropriate behavior in 
public,23 improper wording when speaking about the victims of a 
catastrophe24 or the organizers of a terrorist attack,25 or government 
officials who exceed their authority.26 In addition, the target is not 
aware that they are going to be involved in such a massive act. 
In addition, DV, unlike conventional action, is no longer restricted 
to one nation, state, or village.27, 28 This is due to two things. First, 
the technological tools that are used to make the act of DV make it 
easy to remove boundaries and helps the perpetrators get into “dis-
tant” issues; one of the goals of social media is to help people who 
are scattered all around the world to connect, to eliminate the feeling 
of distance.29 On the other hand, the actions that cause reactions are 
23 Clune B., “Digital Vigilantism: Think Before Putting Pictures of Wrongdoing Online,” 
The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/29/digital-
vigilantism-think-before-pictures-of-wrongdoing-online>, 2013 03 07.
24 Fortey I., “8 Awsome Cases of Internet Vigilantism,” Cracked, <http://www.cracked.
com/article_17170_8-awesome-cases-internet-vigilantism.html>, 2019 03 07.
25 Hill C., “How Digital Communities Cope: Cyber-vigilantism Following the Boston 
Marathon Bombings,” The Yale Review of International Studies, <http://yris.yira.org/
essays/2039>, 2019 03 07.
26 Key, “Sue me if you dare, my dad is Li Gang,” Chinehush, <http://www.chinahush.
com/2010/10/21/sue-me-if-you-dare-my-dad-is-li-gang/>, 2019 03 07.
27 Kucera M., Mares M., “Vigilantism During Democratic Transition,” Policing and So-
ciety 25 (2), 2015, p. 170–187.
28 Kingsley D., “Keeping a close Watch–the Rise of Self-surveillance and the Threat of 
Digital Exposure,” The Sociological Review 56 (3), 2008, p. 347–357.
29 Fuchs C., Social Media: A Critical Introduction, London: Sage, 2017. 
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not necessarily included in the local jurisdictions or legal systems. 
For example, scam baiting30 – the police find it extremely difficult 
or even impossible to handle such cases,31 which enables the vigi-
lantes to gain even greater self-confidence and a sense of legitimacy, 
because they feel as if they are solving problems in no-man’s land, a 
place where no actual government can intervene. This is caused by 
issues in intermediate states, existing between countries and systems. 
Another key difference is that the participants of the lynch law 
usually have a strong anti-establishment rhetoric. Nevertheless, as 
scientists point out, DV’s relationship with the government and the 
police is much more complex; in some cases, they actually act as an 
aid to the state and not as a force against it – for example, sharing in-
formation about the criminals that is not necessarily obtained through 
legal means.32 
Because many vigilantes act anonymously in the virtual world, it 
is impossible or at least terribly difficult to punish those whose ac-
tions actually deserve punishment. Thus, the tables turn, and now the 
other side feels that the legal system and the state cannot protect and 
defend them against inadequate or essentially unfair shaming acts. In 
this case, DV may serve “as means for small independent groups to 
exercise social power and control over marginalized and underrep-
resented groups <…> and has the capacity of web-distributed visual 
imagery to sustain a new kind of sadistic hegemony. <…> circula-
tion of the digital – networked images concomitantly perpetuates and 
motivates unjust and undemocratic desires.”33 
30 Andrews R., “Baiters teach Scammers a Lesson,” Wired, <https://www.wired.
com/2006/08/baiters-teach-scammers-a-lesson/>, 2018 06 14.
31 Trottier D., “Coming to Terms with Social Media Monitoring: Uptake and Early As-
sessment,” Crime, Media, Culture 11 (3), 2015, p. 317–333.
32 Trottier D., “Digital Vigilantism as Critical Reinforcement of Law and Order,” Re. 
Framing Activism, 2019 03 07, <http://reframe.sussex.ac.uk/activistmedia/2016/04/
digital-vigilantism-as-critical-reinforcement-of-law-and-order/>, 2019 03 07. 
33 Kasra, p. 173.
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2. A New Form of Political Act: Analyzing  
the Example of Digital Vigilantism
2.1. The Postmodern Technology Paradox:  
Individuality and Connectivity 
One of the main differences between digital and traditional vigilan-
tism is that DV is implemented by using technological tools. And the 
tool level is very important here, because when we understand how 
new technologies are created and how the perception of the human 
is changed by using them, only then we can better understand DV. In 
one of his famous articles, Martin Heidegger claims that “technol-
ogy is not equivalent to the essence of technology,”34 The key is to 
understand that technology cannot be perceived merely as a neutral 
tool, because then it would appear that this tool can be completely 
controlled by people. We cannot control the technologies we cre-
ated – that does not mean that they can act on their own, but it is 
impossible to control them and know how they will be used in reality 
(e.g., nuclear power and the atomic bomb, Facebook and Cambridge 
Analytica, etc.) 
In his essay, Heidegger claims that modern technology can only 
come about when there is an attitude that everything can be trans-
formed and re-arranged, that all the objects of the world are divided 
into parts that can be used to create new things. Things and beings 
can no longer simply be present; everything has to be restored ac-
cording to the designed laws and this reality has to be established 
as genuine. The whole reality is restored into a stagnant reservoir, 
a repository of resources (Bestand), from which one can constantly 
take the things one needs.35
34 Heidegger M., The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, New York: 
Harper & Row, 1977, p. 287. 
35 Heidegger M., The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, New York: 
Harper & Row, 1977, p. 287–318. 
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When reality is perceived as a repository of resources, it can be 
used – sold, exchanged, owned, transformed, and designed. Real-
ity becomes an abstract; it does not exist in the present, it is a proj-
ect of the future. When it becomes this, the lack of it can be felt 
immediately,36 since it is not specifically realized at present: there 
are only resources that enable us to create it, but this process never 
ceases – we must constantly recreate and reinstate reality.
The most important change occurs when there is a realization that 
people’s “role in terms of the relationship with being also inevita-
bly changes. This occurs because modern technology, as an order-
ing revealing, is not only a consequence of the expression of human 
action, it acquires the function of an autonomous and self-regulat-
ing power”37 [translated by the author]. People themselves become 
standing-reserves, they are no longer (only) human – they are energy 
and resources that can be used. 
By analyzing the technological development, which is relevant 
in the case of digital vigilantism, one can see the paradox that in 
certain situations people are treated as one unimportant mass that 
needs to be used as effectively and efficiently as possible. One way 
to see technology is to stress that it operates by leveling and equal-
izing people. For instance, social media is for everyone, its availabil-
ity is not restricted to any person (except for the age limit, etc.). On 
the other hand, in different contexts, a totally individualistic way of 
treating both people and their bodies begins to prevail. The body is 
treated as unique and inimitable; we must conform to everyone, find 
the most appropriate way to influence them, and act towards the same 
goal, but this is done with all individuals in different ways, adapting 
to their specific characteristics. With the development of science, an 
individual’s inimitability is discovered and absolute value is given 
36 Smith G. B., “Heidegger, Technology and Postmodernity,” Social Science Journal 28, 
1991, p. 369–389.
37 Vėželis T., “Gamtos ir technikos santykių problema Heideggerio dialoge su daoizmu,” 
Andrijauskas A. (ed.), Rytai-Vakarai. Komparatyvistinės studijos I X ,  Vilnius: 
Lietuvos kultūros tyrimų institutas, 2010, p. 318–336.
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to it. One of the basic medical terms nowadays is genome (genetic 
code) – a proof of the uniqueness of the individual. Each individual 
has a unique DNA sequence that cannot be matched by anyone else in 
the world. This uniqueness is consolidated even before they appears 
on this earth; they do not have to do anything to be treated as unique, 
and it is recorded in their body. Thus, people are unique without do-
ing anything “remarkable” – in terms of biology, all people, despite 
their morals, aspirations, and desires, are treated as equally unique. 
So that is the path of medicine; but on the other hand, we can see the 
same individualistic approach in digital advertising, where the idea is 
to personalize the internet for everybody. 
Technologies create such conditions that allow, encourage, or 
even force us (not somebody with expert knowledge, like scientists 
or philosophers, but anybody) to treat our bodies as a circumstance, 
a case, a study, something external. People are encouraged to know 
their blood type, maintain a healthy lifestyle, and by doing this “un-
derstand” the needs of their bodies and be able to evaluate them. 
Nowadays it is trendy to have health apps that help users get and 
evaluate data about their personal health issues.38 People are accus-
tomed (by individual apps, because of convenience) or in some cases 
required (by national e-systems, when all data are only online) to 
put a lot of different information about themselves on the internet, 
which is one of the main ways of how vigilantes get information. It 
is also extremely important to understand that any attempt to invade 
the body and one’s privacy is received highly sensitively and poses 
an enormous danger. Thus, it could be extremely painful to merely 
have the vigilantes share the information (i.e., doxing).
Postmodern technologies are considered to be incredibly com-
plex; it is commonplace to believe that mastering them requires a 
specific education and knowledge. It should be noted that in almost 
38 Sharon T., “Self-tracking for Health and the Quantified Self: Re-articulating Autono-
my, Solidarity, and Authenticity in an Age of Personalized Healthcare,” Philosophy & 
Technology 30.1, 2017, p. 93–121.
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all postmodern technologies, small, often invisible “magic” particles 
(stem cells, nanoparticles, genes and such) play a major role.39 They 
are “magic” because people no longer understand how the things that 
they use actually work, they only know the “spells” – the gene, the 
bite, the nano, and they use these words while trying to talk about 
things that they actually do not understand. This escalation of magic 
and incomprehensibility arises because postmodern technologies are 
completely dependent on specialized knowledge, and it is simply im-
possible for the ordinary citizen to comprehend them. It is important 
to understand that making technological objects is extremely com-
plicated, but actually using them at home without putting too much 
thought into it is gradually becoming easier.
However, the case of DV shows that some people have “magi-
cal” powers and are able to read, translate, and use the new language 
collectively, using it to decipher personal data, shame or otherwise 
affect people involved in those cases that personally touch or inter-
est them. The particular personal interest could be even not the story 
itself but the will to test one’s hacking skills. Some of the stories of 
DV show the enormous efforts made by hundreds of people to find 
a specific person and punish them (even for relatively insignificant 
inappropriate behavior). It requires a large amount of time and other 
resources, which is why traditional law enforcement or other institu-
tions do not carry out such investigations, but internet users might 
gather and make these cases public. 
In the presence of such a human condition, consumerist, profit-
seeking, predatory relationships can be very easily realized, and the 
possession and control of resources becomes an aim in itself. It is 
precisely this set of assumptions that allows Bauman’s swarm con-
cept to be applied.
39 Haraway D. J., Manifestly Haraway, Vol. 37, Minnesota: Minnesota Press, 2016, 
p. 12–13. 
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2.2. Swarms and Digital Vigilantism
In his book Consuming Life, Bauman puts forward the notion of 
swarms. According to Bauman, the swarm changes the group and the 
community; people gather together only driven by certain ideas, in-
terests, desires, or activities, but these gatherings only last as long as 
their desired action continues. There is no continuity – a person can 
belong to several swarms at one time, assemble, disperse, and gather 
again; there is almost no commitment or responsibility.40 Bauman’s 
conception of the swarm can be better understood by analyzing DV.
DV is temporary, yet a process rather than a one-time act, al-
though the contribution of different people varies greatly. In the first 
stage, someone points out a case of wrong behavior, and then the 
same person or someone else who is personally, individually affected 
by that behavior, and who has the necessary information technol-
ogy tools (i.e., can access relevant data), starts sharing personal data 
of the alleged wrongdoer. It is important to understand that the end 
result is never the result of just one person’s efforts: someone has 
found one piece of information, someone has shared a link leading 
to relevant information, someone has published CCTV records, and 
someone has viewed them, and so on. A later phase, which actually 
happens parallel to the first stage, is the sharing of data – either by 
exposing the inappropriate behavior or publishing the wrongdoer’s 
personal information. The last stage is a reaction, which already hap-
pens in reality rather than in the virtual space. People get sanctions: 
they are fired from their jobs, they get condemned by others, and they 
get fines or even go to jail.
In developing the concept of swarms, Bauman stresses that 
“Swarms are not teams; they know nothing of the division of labour. 
They are <…> no more than the ‘sum of their parts,’ or rather ag-
gregate of self-propelled units, united solely <…> by ‘mechanical 
solidarity,’ manifested in the replication of similar patterns of con-
40 Bauman, p. 76–77.
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duct and by moving in a similar direction. They can be visualized 
best as Warhol’s endlessly copied images with no original, or with an 
original discarded after use and impossible to trace and retrieve.”41 
According to the image drawn by Bauman, a swarm starts to 
work when each member of the swarm continuously repeats the same 
action,42 tweeting and retweeting, sharing and re-sharing. And most 
importantly, each action is done individually, without being coordi-
nated. 
Still, the case of DV raises some doubts concerning Bauman’s 
ideas – he claims that there are no specialists in a swarm, they are all 
“jacks-of-all-trades”43 and no one assists each other. It is important 
to understand that DV does not really work as a traditional team, but 
the division of labor exists. However, it happens completely acciden-
tally, without assigning anyone to any tasks. Nevertheless, the case 
of DV shows that sometimes people act through supplementing each 
other’s weaknesses or lack of resources – if one hacker cannot de-
code all data, he just uploads whatever he has, and this unprocessed 
data is taken by someone else to complete the unfinished task, as if 
compensating for the previous hacker’s drawbacks.
Postmodernism “does not mean that the ‘normal,’ weekday con-
duct of the individuals has become random, un-patterned and un-
coordinated. It only means that the non-randomness, regularity and 
coordination of individually undertaken actions can be, and are as a 
rule, attained by other means than the solid-modern expedients and 
stratagems of enforcement.”44 According to Bauman, discipline and 
punishment are no longer enough, other mechanisms are at work.
By using the term biopower, Foucault essentially states that tra-
ditional politics are changing and are being replaced by a completely 
different system, with no single clear center, no clear leader – a di-
41 Bauman, p. 76–77.
42 Ibid., p. 77.
43 Ibid., p. 77.
44 Bauman, p. 75–78.
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visive micro-policy that lives in local contexts and creates certain 
identities.45 In a swarm, “every command from above” is superflu-
ous. After all, swarms truly do not have superior positions of power; 
the current direction of their flight only puts some of the dynamics of 
a self-propelled vehicle into the positions of “leaders to be followed,” 
which they occupy temporarily and which change unpredictably. The 
sense of trust and security that magically coordinates the movement 
of the swarm is the best and equally as effective substitute for the 
authority of the group leaders.46 It is quite obvious that there are no 
distinct leaders in the processes of DV – every prompting to take 
action seems exaggerated because the process is either happening 
or not. The most interesting part is that it is never possible to guess 
which form of bad behavior will trigger such a severe reaction, it 
happens spontaneously every time, it accelerates remarkably quickly 
and crashes when the general interest dissipates.
When the system is changed and biopower is operating, when the 
“government is everywhere,” it no longer has a definite center or a 
subject that both creates it and is responsible for it. The government 
is withdrawn from a clear position in the society, leaving imitation in 
its place – i.e., governments, states, and politicians who seemingly 
implement politics still exist, but this just disguises the real position 
of the government, which is impossible to pinpoint. It hides in every-
day life and takes root as a biopower through various microprocesses 
and new mechanisms of control: “<…> I do not mean to say that the 
law fades into the background or that the institutions of justice tend to 
disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a norm, 
and that the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a 
continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose 
functions are for the most part regulatory. A normalizing society is 
the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life. We 
45 Foucault M., The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Vol. I, New York: Vintage, 
1990, p. 135–145. 
46 Bauman, p. 75–78.
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have entered a phase of juridical regression in comparison with the 
pre-seventeenth-century societies.”47
Most importantly, regardless of the processes in reality, the con-
demnation – fair or unfair – occurs in the virtual world, as if each 
person individually decides if there was a violation, a threat to the 
state, morality, order, etc. or not. According to Foucault, power is 
established not through the main arteries but through small capillar-
ies48: e.g., various expert systems are spread across all sections of the 
population, and biopower is spreading through them; governments 
are no longer competent institutions; decisions are taken in hospitals, 
laboratories, schools – not just in the parliament. 
Another remarkable aspect of the manifestation of biopower is that 
it is getting more and more impossible to pinpoint what is non-politi-
cal life, to distinguish between what is private and what is public and 
also what is a state and what is social. “Vigilantism is typically un-
derstood as extra-state, popular and extra-legal, yet it takes on ‘state-
like performances such as security enforcement <…> a perpetual 
renegotiation of the boundaries between state and society.’”49 Along 
with what is private and public, Facebook merges all different worlds 
of citizens: colleagues, friends, family, classmates, and bosses.50 This 
is one of the reasons why actions are so easily transposed from one 
context to another. This way, someone who misbehaved – say, yelled 
at a child in a park – may be dismissed from work the following day, 
for an act that is not actually related to this person’s direct duties. The 
shaming campaign can be so massive that the employer simply does 
not want to be associated with that person, although had they simply 
found out about the incident privately, perhaps they would judge that 
particular employee personally, but a dismissal could not be justified 
47 Foucault, p. 144.
48 Ibid., p. 135–145.
49 Trottier, “Digital Vigilantism as Weaponisation of Visibility,” p. 55–72; Burr and Jen-
sen, 2004, p. 144, as cited in Trottier ibid.
50 Trottier D., Social Media as Surveillance: Rethinking Visibility in a Converging World, 
Routledge, 2016, p. 1–7. 
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in this case. A complete refusal to establish the boundaries of what is 
private and what is public is a dangerous predicament, as everything 
may be considered public then and privacy in general disappears.
Therefore, the consequences for those who have experienced mass 
condemnation are often quite horrible not only in the virtual world, 
but also in reality: loss of employment, reputation, expulsion from 
university, incarceration, and such. However, in reality, nobody takes 
responsibility for the shaming campaign; more precisely, it gets split 
up among all the members of the swarm, who can surprisingly quickly 
forget or ignore their participation in any action. “In the case of hu-
man feelings and thoughts, the comfort of flying in a swarm derives 
from having security in numbers: a belief that the direction of flight 
must have been properly chosen since an impressively large swarm 
is following it, a supposition that so many feeling, thinking and freely 
choosing human beings could not be simultaneously fooled.”51 Same 
as in the conversation mentioned above, people do not think of re-shar-
ing or re-tweeting as a substantial action, since so many people have 
done it before them – they do not feel responsible for the information 
that they share, even if it later turns out to be fake news.
Conclusions
The core of DV, which very well represents Bauman’s idea of the 
swarm, could be described in the following way: “digital vigilan-
tism is a process where citizens are collectively offended by other 
citizens’ activity, and coordinate (spontaneously and autonomous-
ly mobilizing) retaliation on mobile devices and social platforms. 
These offensive acts are typically not meant to generate large-
scale recognition. Therefore, the targets of DV are initially unaware 
of the conflict in which they have been enrolled”52 [highlighted by 
the author]. 
51 Ibid., p. 77.
52 Trottier, “Digital Vigilantism as Weaponisation of Visibility,” p. 55–72. 
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After analyzing DV as an example of the postmodern way of be-
ing political, some conclusions about how political life may change 
or is changing can be drawn. It is becoming clearer that postmodern 
technology and life have shifted from ideas of modern unification to 
the individualistic “no pill for everybody” view. There is less and less 
need for traditional collective forms of being/acting/participating (po-
litical parties, communities, stable groups, etc.). Therefore, swarms, 
members of which are connected by weak links, may change the group 
and community. Some specific issue or interest holds them together for 
an extremely short period (in comparison with communities). Swarms 
gather, scatter, and gather again, from one occasion to another, every 
time inevitably for a different reason, and are attracted by changeable 
aims.53 However, swarms can be remarkably effective.
The problem that paradoxically comes from the technologization 
of life is its urge for simplification. When technology and science 
are too difficult, too complex, and when the perception of life also 
gets more and more complicated, there is a call from users to make 
everything easier. This may be viewed from two perspectives. On the 
one hand, this basically entails making life more convenient, when 
as many things as possible can be done with a few clicks of a button 
(and there is no need to know how exactly the machine is work-
ing). On the other hand, living with “hidden/complex” technology, 
“hidden/complex” bureaucracy, “hidden/complex” politics brings 
the will to destroy or to neglect these irritating complexities. One 
example is populism, the ideas of which work when they simplify a 
particular social problem to one magical solution. Another aspect of 
that kind of simplification is reducing morality down to black-and-
white judgments, leaving no space for complex feelings, for intricate, 
ambiguous situations. This is the so-called “grey” area, where “real 
humanity manifests itself.”54
53 Palese E., “Zygmunt Bauman. Individual and Society in the Liquid Modernity,” Sprin-
gerPlus 2.1, 2013, p. 191.
54 Ronson J., “Strange Answers to the Psychopath Test,” <https://www.ted.com/talks/
jon_ronson_strange_answers_to_the_psychopath_test>, 2018 06 15.
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A faster than previous and constantly changing lifestyle is, in a 
way, closely interconnected with a lack of responsibility for one’s 
actions. Users find themselves in situations where, because of ano-
nymity, and because of the rules of social media, there are no obvious 
personal consequences; the understanding that everything is inter-
connected and complex, paradoxically, makes users pay less effort to 
reflect and try to understand the impact of their acts. 
In addition, it is becoming harder and harder to distinguish be-
tween what is completely private and what is not. What actions be-
long to the political sphere, and are there some areas that are not 
political? Which actions should be taken by the state, and which by 
private individuals or collective groups? If Bauman and Foucault 
are right, then in the future, our lives will have less clearly defined 
boundaries, be less stable, and politics will become more and more 
reactive and spontaneous. 
These conclusions reflect that DV shares different features with 
other postmodern phenomena. As planet Earth becomes “smaller,” 
and Nomads still need to travel, we can foresee the possibility of 
travelling to/from different realities and different systems created or 
simulated by/with new technological tools. Technologically created 
new realities could be seen as New Lands (H. Arendt in The Origins 
of Totalitarianism wrote that there are no more new lands to hide or 
to explore), where are no law is present, or where a new law is cre-
ated. So, it is possible that in these “new lands,” other ways of being 
political or being social are emerging, and that DV is only one such 
example. However, the most important thing in the future will be to 
decide whether users should merge the different systems or try to 
regard the virtual way of being as some additional features of society.
Of course, there are more additional questions to ask and answer, 
but political philosophers should pay more attention to such process-
es as DV in order to find suitable ways of understanding the new 
forms of political acts and be capable of evaluating and researching 
them. It is still unclear how the paradoxes of DV could be solved – 
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the desire to protect the public’s norms transforming into a develop-
ment of anti-democratic values, the striving for security becoming 
the extension of discipline and control, and the provision of power to 
the citizens shaping the doctrine of universal surveillance.
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